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Abstract
The  New  Economic  Partnership  for  Africa’s  Development  constitutes  a  new 
initiative  to  development,  created  by  the  African  states  themselves  with  an 
ultimate goal to be more integrated in the global economy on more equal terms 
and thereby reduce poverty within the continent. NEPAD sees democracy, good 
governance  and  human  rights  as  necessary  for  sustainable  development.  This 
thesis examines the assumptions made behind the creation of NEPAD and how 
different forms of power can explain its creation and design from a rational choice 
point  of  view.  Furthermore  the  thesis  looks  at  the  assumption  and  design  to 
evaluate how NEPAD can get states to comply with its objectives. The result is 
that  NEPAD  show  traces  of  the  structural  power  of  global  governance  by 
acknowledging the African position as underdeveloped. The initiating states have 
been  able  to  exercise  institutional  power  when  certain  values,  norms  and 
procedures were put at heart of NEPAD. Institutional power has also effectively 
excluded other roads to development  when the members of the African Union 
chose to integrate NEPAD as a formal part of the AU. The assumptions behind 
the creation and the preferences of member states of the AU had implications on 
the institutional design, especially when the peer review mechanism was created 
which have left monitoring compliance of NEPAD’s objectives much to the states 
volunteering to be reviewed 
Keywords:  NEPAD,  APRM,  Rational  Choice  Institutionalism,  Compliance,  
Institutional design, Power.
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Abbreviations
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
AU African Union
CSO Civil Society Organization
ECOSOCC Economic, Social and Cultural Council
EU European Union
FDC Forum for Democratic Change
G8 Group of 8
HSGIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO International Organization
NAI New African Initiative
NEPAD New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OAU Organization of African Unity
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
POA Program of Action
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC Peace and Security Counsel
SAP Social Adjustment Program
UN United Nations
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WTO World Trade Organization
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1. Introduction
“Good governance is  perhaps the single  most  important  factor  in  eradicating  
poverty and promoting development” (Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, cited 
in Hope 2005:285)
The underdevelopment of Africa as a region is no secret and a well recognized 
problem. Since the 1960s, when most African states gained their independence, 
despite several  development  plans, relatively little  progress have been made to 
close the development gap between developing and developed states. Africa, and 
mainly its Sub-Saharan region, maintains the most underdeveloped region in the 
world (Edozie 2004:146). 
New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) has been 
introduced  as  a  new,  voluntary,  framework  for  Africa’s  future  development. 
Building on principles such as human rights, democracy,  good governance and 
conflict resolution it offers an acknowledgement of these ideas by African leaders 
(Edozie 2004:147). At the same time NEPAD can be seen as a response to the 
challenging  of  Africa’s  collective  sovereignty  by the  international  community, 
especially the World Bank, IMF and WTO (Edozie 2004:147). 
An African initiative for Africa’s development offers promising tendencies 
of regional, national or even local ownership. However, the question of ownership 
when financing NEPAD heavily depends on aid and foreign investments remains 
unclear. Even more interesting is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
which have been created and designed to assess and monitor the progress made by 
African countries in meeting their commitment towards achieving the  principles 
of human rights, democracy and good governance (Hope 2005:289). 
According to Hope (2005:285),  good governance entails  the existence of 
efficient  and  accountable  institutions,  including  political,  administrative, 
economic and corporate. It further entails entrenched rules that promote human 
rights, development, respect of the rule of law, and ensure that people are free to 
participate in, and be heard on, decisions that affect their lives (Hope 2005:285). 
Up to days date more than half of the members of the African Union have signed 
up for the APRM and thereby voluntarily agreed to be evaluated. Does this mean 
that a real change in the opinion regarding human rights, good governance and 
democracy is about to happen in these states and how is compliance with these 
norms and values secured? 
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1.1 Statement of purpose
The purpose of the thesis is dual. First, the thesis aims to explain the creation and 
design of NEPAD from a rational choice institutionalist perspective.  The second 
part of the purpose builds on the first and aims to evaluate how NEPAD, through 
its design can get states to comply with the norms and ideas central to NEPAD. 
To  fulfill  the  purpose  concepts  of  power  will  be  analyzed  from  a  new 
institutionalist  perspective.  More  specifically  the  thesis  will  be  concentrated 
around the following questions:
• How can power relations explain the creation of NEPAD and its design?
• What implications have NEPAD’s design to its ability to exercise different 
forms of power for enforcement?
1.2 Delimitations
When analyzing  power in  relation  to  NEPAD it  is  close  to  impossible  not  to 
include other actors than NEPAD itself i.e. the initiating states or the states signed 
up for the APRM and there is no intention to exclude these actors in the analysis. 
However,  due to limited space and time for the thesis,  actors outside NEPAD 
which possibly could exercise power in relation to NEPAD through “enhanced 
partnerships” will be excluded as far as possible, although they will inevitable be 
mentioned. 
1.3 Disposition
The thesis begins with an introductory chapter where the problem is discussed and 
the  purpose  of  the  thesis  specified.  After  this  introductory  chapter,  some 
methodological considerations, together with a discussion on the material which 
the thesis builds on are presented and shortly evaluated. Chapter 3 and 4 are both 
theoretical  chapters  where  chapter  3  begins  with  a  short  introduction  on  new 
institutionalism and proceeds with the rational choice institutionalism as the main 
theoretical  approach.  In addition a model  for categorizing actors in a pre- and 
post-decisional  phase  is  presented.   Chapter  4  provides  a  framework  for 
conceptualizing  power  in  global  governance  and  the  chapter  ends  with 
presentation  on  different  forms  of  power  and  a  section  where  the  main 
contributions  from both  theoretical  chapters  are  outlined  as  a  short  analytical 
framework. Chapter 5 considers the governance situation in which NEPAD was 
created and draws on the assumptions behind the creation of NEPAD. Chapter 6 
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connects  the assumptions  made,  with the institutional  design and connects  the 
design to concepts of power available for actors in different positions to NEPAD. 
This chapter ends with an analysis of how actors have both used different forms of 
power available  to  them but  also how power is  resisted by actors.  Finally the 
thesis ends with a concluding chapter and a discussion on the results. 
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2. Methodology
2.1 Methodological considerations 
The  choice  of  using  Barnett  and  Duvall’s  framework  for  analyzing  power  in 
global governance, and to understand the driving forces behind the creation of 
NEPAD and how compliance of its values can be reached validates the choice of 
new institutionalism as theoretical approach. New Institutionalism, in contrast to 
“old” institutionalism and its  descriptive-inductive  method,  does  not  reject  the 
deductive method of testing theories on how institutions work and interact with 
actors (Lowndes 2002:95, 102). 
The methodology of this thesis is qualitative in its nature since the aim is to 
try  to  understand a  case in  given  context  which is  hard,  if  not  impossible,  to 
measure  with  quantitative  methods  (Devine  2002:197).  By  positivists,  the 
qualitative method is seen as a problematic stance to science since the interpretive 
epistemological  view,  which  it  derives  from,  does  not  believe  in  a  objective 
science to establish universal truths or exist independent of beliefs, values and 
concepts (Devine 2002:201). Nevertheless, the strength of the qualitative method 
is that it creates a deeper understanding about a particular phenomenon or case, 
but in turn a lot, if not all, chances of generalization is lost. However, the aim of 
this thesis is not to draw generalizations but to study the case for its own sake in 
an ideographic effort (Lundquist 1993:71). The ideographic effort is connected to 
the  hermeneutic  approach  where  the  previous  understanding  of  the  subject  is 
central for the course of the thesis and constitutes the “objective“ starting point 
(Holme & Solvang 1997:95). At the same time, it  is important to be aware of 
one’s interpretive glasses to keep biases to a minimum. 
Since the thesis  aims to explain a phenomenon the option of the role of 
theory is threefold (Esaiasson et al. 2002:33f). First, the study can consume theory 
in studies where the case is central to explain. Second, the study can test a theory, 
or theories, where the theory is central to the study where the case is used to test 
the theory. Finally, the study can aim to develop a theory. This thesis is mainly a 
theory consumptive  study but  if  shortcomings  of  the chosen theory are  found 
these will be presented which also gives the study a character of theory testing as 
well.
Choosing NEPAD as a case study also has its methodological implications. 
NEPAD’s time span is relatively short which might affect the possibilities to draw 
far-reaching conclusions how power is exercised in relation to NEPAD, due to a 
limited number of peer review reports. Instead, the peer review reports available 
have to stand as examples and compared to the possibilities  to exercise power 
8
STVM01
outlined in the NEPAD documents. Although NEPAD is a new type of framework 
for  development  in  the  African  context,  and  therefore  are  hard  to  put  in 
comparison with other development programs, the study of NEPAD can, despite 
its ideographic character, still stand as an example on how power is affected by 
institutional design. However, the most challenging methodological aspect of this 
study is the question of validity, hence measure what is supposed to be measured 
(Esaiasson et al. 2002:63). When the thesis depends on written materials to fulfill 
the purpose it is important to ask questions to the texts,  and more importantly 
asking  the  right  questions  since  complex  concepts  like  power  increases  the 
problem of validity (Esaiasson et al. 2002:65, 244). 
2.2 Material – a critical evaluation
Primary materials for the thesis are official NEPAD documents and peer review 
reports from African states participating in the partnership. However, this thesis 
will  mainly  use  secondary  materials  in  form  of  journal  articles,  academic 
publications and in some rare cases news articles will be used to exemplify recent 
happenings connected to NEPAD. Like all methodological choices the analysis of 
texts  and  written  materials  has  implications,  especially  when  the  analysis  is 
heavily  dependent  on  secondary  materials.   It  is  crucial  to  reflect  on  the 
relationship between the author and the reader.  Who has written the source in 
question  and  who  is  the  supposed  reader?  This  is  part  of  Esaiasson  et  al. 
(2002:304f) four classic rules for evaluating the truthfulness of material, namely 
evaluating the tendency,  authenticity,  independence and contemporariness of the 
material.  In  this  case  neither  the  authenticity,  independence nor  the 
contemporariness is a major problem. The  tendency could possibly cause some 
problem if one is not aware of it, since there might be incitements for individual 
states to give prominence to their progress and withhold violations of i.e. human 
rights  in  their  peer  review  reports.  However,  since  the  thesis  partly  aims  to 
evaluate how actors exercise different forms of power their own statements could 
be part of this analysis.
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3. Theoretical approach
3.1 New Institutionalism
When studying  International  Organizations (IOs)  new institutionalism offers  a 
good  starting  point  since  it  argues  that  institutions  matters.   In  the  “old” 
institutionalism institutions and political organizations was mainly referred to as 
the same thing, but with the introduction of new institutionalism the definition of 
institution  was  widened  to  include  rules,  norms,  practices  and  values  that 
constrain and shape behavior (Peters & Pierre 1998:565). The somewhat complex 
context  in  which  NEPAD  finds  itself  does  not  pose  a  major  problem  when 
analyzing its ability to make states comply with its rules and norms using the new 
institutional  perspective.  From  its  origin  as  a  voluntary  framework  for 
development open to all African states sharing its values it is now referred to as 
the  development  framework  of  the  African  Union  where  the  peer  review 
mechanism is  voluntary  (Maluwa  2006:295),  which  means  that  NEPAD now 
concerns all members of the African Union1.  
The new institutionalism approach is also compatible with the four concepts 
of power which will be presented further in later chapters. Since the four concepts 
of power all is either expressions of interaction or social constitution and is either 
direct or diffuse in its specificity of social relations of power they all have implicit 
views  on  both  agency  and  structure  (Barnett  &  Duvall  2005:12f).  However, 
Barnett and Duvall (2005:13) stress that none of the types of power is entirely 
agency,  or structural,  perspectives. To take a step back to new institutionalism 
normative institutionalism argues that institutions have influence on the behavior 
of actors by shaping their  values,  norms,  interests,  ideas,  identities  and beliefs 
(Lowndes 2002:95). On the contrary Rational Choice institutionalism claim that 
institutions  influence  behavior  by  affecting  structures  in  which  actors  behave 
rational  to  pursue  their  own interests  (Lowndes  2002:95).  In other  words  the 
former  builds  on  the  idea  of  “logic  of  appropriateness”  where  structure  is  a 
dominant factor while the latter emphasizes “logic of consequences”. 
1 Maluwa (2006:295) argue that NEPAD, despite being a formally integrated part of the AU, should still be seen 
as the voluntary program of like-minded states that it was originally intended to be.  
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3.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism
The rational  choice form of institutionalism,  which will  be used in this  thesis, 
offers the possibility to explain not just the creation and design of NEPAD but 
also  how  power  is  exercised  by,  or  through,  NEPAD.  Rational  choice 
institutionalists take on a “calculus approach” to explain how institutions affect 
individual’s  behavior  (Hall  &  Taylor  1996:945).  This  implies  that  an  actor’s 
behavior  is  likely  to  be  driven,  not  by  impersonal  historical  forces,  but  by  a 
strategic  calculus  and  this  calculus  will  be  deeply  affected  by  the  actor’s 
expectations  about  how  others  are  likely  to  behave  as  well  (Hall  &  Taylor 
1996:945).  This  is  related  to  two  other  assumptions  characteristic  of  rational 
choice institutionalism. First, actors are assumed to have a fixed set of preferences 
or tastes, behave instrumentally to maximize these preferences,  and do so in a 
strategic manner (Hall & Taylor 1996:944f). Second, politics is seen as a series of 
collective  action  or  contracting  dilemmas,  which  means,  in  absence  of 
institutional arrangement, actors acting to maximize its preferences may produce 
collectively sub-optimal outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996:945; Tallberg 2003:16). 
To  explain  how  institutions  are  created  one  can  look  at  its  functions,  and 
institutions  simply  exist  and  survive  because  it  fulfills  these  functions  for  the 
actors affected by the institution (Hall & Taylor 1996:945; Tallberg 2003:16). 
3.3 Principal – (Supervisory) -Agent model for compliance 
The  central  idea  behind  the  Principal-Agent  relationship  is  that  the  principal 
engages another actor (agent) to act on its behalf (Tallberg 2003:16). The idea 
origins from the field of economics and has been further developed by American 
scientists in politics of International Organizations (Lake 2007:222). At the same 
time close connections  to the  rational  choice model  of institutionalism can be 
seen, with its discussion on the origin of institutions as solvers of collective action 
problems. In the context  of this  thesis  the P-A or Principal-Supervisory-Agent 
model serves as a tool for categorizing actors in relations to NEPAD more than as 
an  analytical  tool.  The  P-S-A  model  relates  to  a  post-decision  phase  of 
enforcement  and therefore relates to the issue of compliance with the decision 
(Tallberg 2003:25). The question is whether the P-A, or the P-S-A approach as 
Tallberg develops, is compatible with the relationship between AU, NEPAD and 
APRM, and this is fairly related to the question of NEPAD as an actor exercising 
power. The problem with using this model as a analytical tool to its full extent is 
that, in contrast to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), there is no consensus in the literature that NEPAD and APRM has their 
own agenda beyond their mandate. Thus there is less interest in the relationship 
between  the  principal  and  supervisory  body  than  in  the  study  of  European 
governance. 
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What the P-S-A model provides is a division of the functions of states in 
relation to supranational institutions, or IOs, in a post decisional phase (Tallberg 
2003:26). Member governments act on the one hand as principals to the IO, in this 
case NEPAD (or the AU since NEPAD now is a formal part of the AU) assigning 
the task of enforcing compliance to a supervisory body, where states on the other 
hand acting as agents supposed to implement shared agreements.  From rational 
choice point of view compliance is a collective action dilemma where each state 
has  the  incentives  of  free-riding,  or  not  to  comply,  but  where  the  purpose of 
cooperation would be undermined by widespread non-compliance, which explain 
the creation of a supervisory body (Tallberg 2003:26). 
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4. Power – concepts for making states comply
4.1 Concepts of power in global governance 
To be able to analyze NEPAD’s ability to make states comply with its objectives 
it is crucial to evaluate its powers as a supervisory body, but also how power can 
be exercised by other actors through NEPAD. Globalization, by many seen as a 
consequence  of  increased  connections  between  states  and  people,  has  made 
governance  and  rule-making  at  a  global  level  necessary  (Barnett  &  Duvall 
2005:1).  NEPAD partly represents a new continental international institution in 
response  to  these  trends  in  political  globalization  (Edozie  2004:147).  Since 
governance  involves  structures,  institutions  and  rules  that  regulate,  guide  and 
control  social  life  which  also  is  central  features  of  power  there  is  a  need, 
according to Barnett and Duvall (2005:2), to analyze the workings of power when 
studying governance and global order. 
A  lot  have  been  written  about  power  and  Barnett  and  Duvall  (2005:3) 
identifies  four  kinds  of  power  in  Power  in  Global  Governance.  Compulsory 
power refers to relations of interaction between actors allowing one actor to use 
direct  control  over  another  actor.  Institutional  power enables  actors  to  have 
indirect control over other actors, e.g. when states design international institutions 
to  work  in  their  advantage  and  the  disadvantage  of  others.  Structural  power 
concerns the structure of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation t 
o one another, and finally,  productive power is a “socially diffuse production of 
subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification” (Barnett & Duvall 2005:3f). 
Together these types of power could provide a fruitful framework for the studies 
of power in international relations since it does not see the types of powers as 
competing and instead encourages considerations of how these relates and interact 
with one another (Barnett  & Duvall  2005:4). The interaction of these types of 
power will be intertwined in the study of the creation, functional assumption and 
design  of  NEPAD.  However,  the  choice  of  rational  choice  institutionalism  as 
theoretical approach will inevitably have implication on the extent to which all 
types of power is applicable to the case  but the four concepts of power will all be 
shortly presented.
4.1.1 Compulsory power
The  main  characteristic  of  Compulsory  power  is  that  it  builds  on  relations 
between actors that allow one to  directly shape the actions of others (Barnett & 
13
STVM01
Duvall 2005:13). Using Dahl classic definition of power “the ability of A to get B 
to do what B otherwise would not do” which falls under this category, Barnett and 
Duvall (2005:13) finds three defining features;  intentionality on part of actor A, 
conflict of desires between A and B and that A is successful because it deploys 
material or ideational  resources. Hay (2002:173) adds a fourth defining feature; 
because power is about effects from a behavior by actors with the aim to exercise 
power over  another  actor,  power is  also a  zero-sum game.  The extent  of  A’s 
power is the extent of B’s lack of power. But as Barnett and Duvall (2005:14) 
notes,  A can also possess power to shape the actions of B without having the 
intention to do so. Hence, Barnett and Duvall (2005:14) argue that power in this 
case should be best  understood from the recipient’s  point of view and not the 
deliverer. Further, resources are not limited to material resources but could as well 
include normative and symbolic resources where NGOs and CSOs can be used as 
illustrating examples. Shaming tactics have been used by many non-state actors to 
get specific targets, usually states or transnational corporations, to comply with 
their norms and values (Barnett & Duvall 2005:15).
4.1.2 Institutional power
Institutional power builds on the idea to control others through indirect means. In 
this  type  of  power  there  is  a  conceptual  focus  on  the  formal  and  informal 
institutions that mediate between A and B, where A through rules and procedures 
that define these institutions are able to steer, guide and constrain others (Barnett 
& Duvall 2005:15). In this definition of power resources is of lesser importance 
since A does not necessarily possess the institution, and in cases where A actually 
can be seen to  have total  control  over an institution it  falls  under compulsory 
power (Barnett & Duvall 2005:16). A second difference from compulsory power 
is that A does not possess power, but instead it is the actions of A that influence 
B’s  behavior  because  A  stands  in  a  particular  relationship  to  the  institutional 
arrangement  in  question  (Barnett  & Duvall  2005:16).  A final  distinction  from 
compulsory power is  that  decisions  not  being made has to  be included in the 
analysis  of institutional power because of institutional  arrangements that  limits 
some  opportunities  and  bias  direction,  mainly  of  collective  action  (Barnett  & 
Duvall 2005:16).
4.1.3 Structural power
Where institutional power focus on constraints on interest-seeking actions, hence 
closer to the rational “logic of consequences” in new institutionalism, structural 
power concerns the determination of social  capacities  and interests  (Barnett  & 
Duvall 2005:18).  To be somewhat more specific it concerns the co-constitutive, 
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internal relations of structural positions, or the direct and mutual constitution of 
the capacities of actors (Burnett & Duvall 2005:18). A direct constitutive relation 
such that structural position A exists only by the virtue of its relation to structural 
position B where Burnett and Duvall (2005:18) gives the master-slave, or capital-
labor relation as classical examples. The social positions actors occupy determine 
social  relational  capacities,  interests  and  subjectivities.  Two  points  should  be 
made  here.  First,  structural  power  does  not  generate  equal  social  privileges. 
Different  positions  usually  mean  differentiated  capacities  and  differentiated 
advantages.  Second,  structural  power  and  social  structures  does  not  only 
constitute  actors  and  capacities  but  also  have  implications  on  the  self-
understanding and subjective interests of actors (Burnett & Duvall 2005:18). 
4.1.4 Productive power
There are several  overlapping characteristics  between structural  and productive 
power.  Social  processes  are,  in  both,  affected  only  through  the  meaningful 
practices of actors, not controlled by specific actors. In both, social capacities are 
socially produced and concerns  how these affect  actors self-understanding and 
perceived interests. Finally, neither of these two concepts of power depends on an 
expressed conflict  (Burnett  & Duvall  2005:20). However,  according to Burnett 
and  Duvall  (2005:20),  there  is  one  major  difference  between  the  two.  Where 
structural power works directly through structural relations, productive power is 
more  about  generalized  and  diffuse  social  processes.  Burnett  and  Duvall 
(2005:20) defines productive power as “the constitution of all social subjects with  
various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive practices of  
broad  and  general  social  scope”.   Burnett  and  Duvall  (2005:20)  note  two 
implications  when focus  is  on  diffuse  social  relations  instead  of  direct  social 
relations. First, productive power concerns discourse, the social processes and the 
systems  of  knowledge  through  which  meaning  is  produced,  fixed,  and  lived, 
experienced  and  transformed.  In  this  context  discourse  refers  to  systems  of 
signification  and  not  dialogues  among  actors  (Burnett  &  Duvall  2005:20f). 
Second, discursive processes and practices produce social identities and capacities 
as they give meaning to them.
4.2 Rational choice institutionalism and power – a combined 
framework for analysis
All the theoretical approaches, models and concepts provide an extremely wide 
range of possibilities for analysis of institutions and power in global governance. 
However,  together  they  bring  some  concepts  and  insights  to  the  thesis.  New 
Institutionalism provides a view on the creation of institutions by rational actors 
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and how actors  are  likely  to  behave.  The  P-S-A model  then  separates  actors’ 
different functions where actors have different preferences in the pre- and post 
decisional phase. The concepts of power could thereafter provide some insight on 
the  means  actors  have  to  their  disposal  to  reach  their  preferences  and  why 
dependent how they are categorized in the P-S-A model and in which phase the 
actors are positioned. 
16
STVM01
5. NEPAD – An African initiative (?)
5.1 African governance- a contextual starting point
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  provide  an  oversight  of  the  situation  in  which 
NEPAD was created. Rational Choice institutionalism denies institutional factors 
as producer of behavior. Instead political institutions influence the structure of a 
situation in which individuals select strategies (Lowndes 2002:95).
Since the 1960s, when African states started to regain their independence 
from colonial powers, they have, according to Edozie (2004:146), been caught in 
competing agendas. The international community with the World Bank and IMF 
have provided financial  and development support to African states who on the 
other hand most of all wanted to develop their own way but with constraining 
economic deficiencies as a colonial legacy (Edozie 2004:146). Edozie (2004:146) 
argue that by the 1990s, international intervention by the international community 
into African countries had not dissipated but had instead expanded and deepened, 
revealing disturbing trends for continental leaders and policy makers. In an era of 
globalization Africa became the global site upon which new international regimes 
administered  new  tools  of  global  governance  in  the  fields  of  politics  and 
economics (Edozie 2004:146).
Despite  these  implementations  the  economic  situation  of  the  African 
continent  remained  marginalized.  When  income  levels  in  most  regions  have 
gotten closer to the OECD countries,  Sub-Saharan Africa has been left  behind 
(Luiz  2006:223).  Additionally,  Chabal  (2002:450)  argue  that  contemporary 
African  politics  is  best  understood  as  the  exercise  of  neo-patrimonial  power. 
Despite formal political structures, power is exercised through informal sectors, or 
as Chabal (2002:450) sees it, power is exercised in the interplay of the formal and 
informal sector. Patrons and clients are in this system connected through vertical 
social chains where bureaucrats can be seen, not as impartial servants, but as links 
in  this  chain.  Where  elections  in  “the  west”  are  partly  a  measurement  of 
accountability,  elections  in  Africa  is  more  of  an  instrument  of  factional 
mobilization.  Accountability  in  a  neo-patrimonial  system  instead  rests  on  the 
extent to which patrons are both able to influence and meet the expectations of 
their clients according to well established norms of reciprocity (Chabal 2002:451). 
According to Chabal (2002:451) this system derives from both pre-colonial and 
colonial factors as well as contemporary factors, but in this case the explanation to 
its existence might be of lesser interest. Instead it might be more interesting for 
the purpose of this  thesis  to ask, not only what implications a system of neo-
patrimonial politics has to the possibilities to make states comply with the norms 
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and  ideas  central  to  NEPAD,  but  also  why  NEPAD  was  created  in  a  neo-
patrimonial system.
Another possible partner in the context of Africa’s development is China 
and  China is,  according to  Thompson (2005:2) an appealing partner for many 
African states for a variety of reasons. China’s approach to bilateral relations and 
economic  development,  characterized  by  Joshua  Cooper  Ramo  (2004)  as  the 
“Beijing  Consensus,”  provides  an  alternative  to  development  and  political 
economic reforms promoted in the “Washington Consensus” of the World Bank 
and IMF (Thompson 2005:2). This balance of power between the “Washington 
Consensus” and “Beijing Consensus” provides some interesting insights in  the 
discussion on power, and mainly that China’s soft power is expanding with the 
“Beijing Consensus”.  China’s  consistent  respect  for  other  nations’  sovereignty 
and persistent refusal to criticize or involve itself in the internal affairs of African 
nations earns it the respect of leaders and elites reluctant to implement painful 
economic  or  political  reforms  demanded  by  “the  West”  (Thompson  2005:2). 
Important to note, like all sorts of power, soft power depends on the context, but 
more  than hard power,  soft  power rests  on the  willingness  of interpreters  and 
receivers (Nye 2004:16). 
African leaders’ embrace of the “Beijing Consensus” reflects perhaps what 
is most attractive about China’s soft power. a long-standing history of friendly 
ties, provision of appreciated, “no-strings-attached” financial and technical aid to 
both  elites  and  the  most  needy,  and  growing  commerce  between  the  world’s 
largest  developing  nation  and the  continent  with  the  most  developing  nations 
(Thompson 2005:2) Soft power, according to Nye (2004:11), of a state rests on 
three resources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policies, and this 
show examples of especially how foreign policy can be used as soft power. 
What  has  been  presented,  albeit  in  very  simplified  terms,  is  a  situation 
where  the  creation  of  NEPAD  is  supposed  to  be  a  rational  choice,  but  it  is 
important  to analyze  the function which NEPAD is assumed to fulfill  to draw 
such a conclusion. 
5.2 The creation of NEPAD – functional assumptions by its 
creators
As been presented above, institutionalists in rational choice theory see the creation 
of political institutions as a result of a rational choice intended to fulfill a given 
function.  Institutions  created  because  of  complex  interdependencies  could  be 
explained by the prevalent balance of power, but power should also be understood 
as issue-specific (Rittberger & Zangl 2006:18). The functional assumptions by the 
creators  of  NEPAD and the validity  of their  assumptions  are  not  uncontested. 
Matthews (2004:497)  argue that  the ways  NEPAD’s creators  see development 
implicitly include three aspects. First, the African situation is seen as undesirable. 
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Second, a desirable future is envisaged and third, a strategy to meet this desirable 
future is presented. These three aspects provide some insight of the assumptions 
behind the creation of NEPAD, especially the first two, although, mainly it is the 
last two aspects that has been contested in the literature (see i.e. Matthews 2004; 
Kanbur 2004). 
The  creators’  view  of  the  undesirable  situation  can  be  seen  in  the 
introductory paragraphs of the NEPAD document which reads: “The Programme 
is  anchored on  the  determination  of  Africans  to  extricate  themselves  and the  
continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising  
world” and “The poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to  
the  prosperity  of  the  developed  world” (NEPAD 2001:p1-2).  Hence,  it  is  the 
underdevelopment and  backwardness that  NEPAD  aims  to  solve  (Matthews 
2004:498). But this does not offer much explanation to why there was a need to 
initiate NEPAD and not adopt a framework within existing political institutions, 
where  the  Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU)  was  the  regional  political 
institution at the time. What is interesting in the above formulations is also that it 
gives  a  hint  on  how  the  African  leaders  constitute  their  position  in  a  global 
system. Resistance to structural power is often generated by attempts to reduce 
inequalities  and change the structures that  sustain it  by those in a  subordinate 
position (Barnett & Duvall 2005:23), and NEPAD could possibly seen as such an 
attempt.
To stay on the choice by the creators to initiate NEPAD outside OAU  a 
brief  history could be in place.  NEPAD came into being in 2001 as the New 
African Initiative (NAI) but was renamed NEPAD later the same year. This was 
happening at the same time as the OAU was pledged to be transformed into the 
AU (Edozie 2004:153). Primarily NEPAD’s focus concern economics but since it 
expressly recognizes that  peace,  security,  good governance,  democracy,  human 
rights  and  sound  economic  management  are  conditions  for  sustainable 
development it is unique in its approach (Maluwa 2006:296). Good governance, 
which NEPAD emphasizes as necessary for development,  has in all its aspects 
been positively correlated to economic development in the past, particularly better 
growth rates by building institutions in support of markets (Hope 2005:284).
The OAUs primary objectives was never to promote human rights or good 
governance  but,  formed  in  1963,  its  primary  objectives  was  instead  a  rapid 
decolonialization,  the  unity  of  the  continent  and  the  defense  of  the  territorial 
integrity  of  states  (Akokpari  2004:244).  Because  the  OAU saw the  collective 
welfare  as  more  important  than  human  rights,  the  search  for  economic 
development led to a flourishing landscape of dictatorships, corruption and bad 
governance  in  general  (Akokpari  2004:244).  Criticized  for  being  week, 
unresponsive  and  incapable  of  addressing  problems  of  contemporary  Africa, 
especially problems with bad governance, the OAU was replaced by the African 
Union (AU) in 2002 (Fombad 2006:9). This very brief history gives some insight 
to why the initiating states did not promote NEPAD as a compulsory framework 
within the OAU. 
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Another aspect of the choice to initiate NEPAD outside of existing political 
institutions  is offered by Hurrell  (2005:37) who argue that institutions is more 
about  power  than  effectiveness  when  one  asks  which  institution  and  why. 
Institutionalism, in contrary of realism, sees it as a rational behavior even for the 
most powerful states to cooperate with others and for the most powerful states the 
question  is  not  between  institutions  and  no  institutions  as  much  as  which 
institution  has  the  best  trade-offs  between  effectiveness  and  control  (Hurrell 
2005:37;  Rittberger  &  Zangl  2006:16).  As  one  of  the  initiating  states,  South 
Africa could make such a choice. According to Bond (2004:602), South African 
president Thabo Mbeki have described global apartheid, as well as post-apartheid 
South Africa, as having ‘two economies’ where impoverishment in the second is 
caused by its marginalization from the first. This, in turn, would justify NEPAD 
as a homegrown version of a ‘Washington Consensus’ strategy for the continent’s 
deepening global integration (Bond 2004:602). 
The preferences of states as principals in the P-S-A model are an interesting 
aspect in the context of NEPAD. Tallberg (2003:29) argue that in the context of 
European  governance  member  states’  preferences  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  one 
single overarching object. In comparison with EU the AU consist of an even more 
diverse constellation of states in different stages of development with different 
forms of political systems where democracy is no fundamental prerequisite (Ilorah 
2004:222ff). Although, this does not have to mean that there is harder to find any 
common preferences in the AU. States have as principals  to the AU agreed to 
adopt NEPAD as a framework within the AU and did this of a purpose. Therefore, 
the preference for states as principals would include a desire for compliance with 
NEPAD by all member states. The fact that APRM have been created to monitor 
compliance  points  this  way.  Another  preference,  which  Ilorah  (2004:233) 
mention,  is  the  protection  of  sovereignty  by  African  states.  Authority  is  only 
delegated when the governments see some potential gains of delegation (Ilorah 
2004:232). In the context of European governance, enforcement weapons are kept 
to a minimum due to similar preferences (Tallberg 2003:29). However, the strictly 
functionalist  view on international  organizations  as institutions  with a function 
only  as  arenas  for  integration  between  actors  fails  to  acknowledge  that  IOs, 
created with rational intentions to fulfill a certain function, gain authority as an 
actor (Barnett & Finnemore 2005:169). This implies that IOs can be explained as 
a rational creation, but once created power is not just exercised by actors through 
IOs,  but  also by IOs themselves,  an aspect  which  will  be returned to  in  later 
chapters.  
The initiating  states have,  by putting emphasis  on certain  values,  norms, 
ideas and processes  for  development  exercised  institutional  power.  By getting 
early  support  from  G8,  EU  and  the  UN,  and  in  addition  potential  financial 
support, this political institution gets attractive to other African states. The support 
from the UN could partly be explained by its view on good governance presented 
by UNDP in  2002 where  it  recognizes  good governance  advances  sustainable 
development (Hope 2005:287). The G8 gave NEPAD its first approval as early as 
2001  and  expressed  its  full  support  in  2002,  albeit  without  making  any 
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commitments themselves (Ilorah 2004:234). The interest in NEPAD from the G8 
illustrates that industrialized countries do believe that there is a barter to be made 
(Luiz 2006:226). First, if NEPAD works the way it is intended then it opens up 
new markets for companies. Second, globalization has been accompanied by new 
threats  for  developed  countries,  i.e.  in  the  form of  terrorism,  immigration  or 
disease. States in underdeveloped regions are, according to Luiz (2006:226), less 
able to eliminate these threats. If NEPAD succeeds then Africa becomes less of a 
potential threat to the industrialized world.
Despite  the  balancing  of  power  in  Africa  between  the  “Washington 
Consensus” and the “Beijing Consensus” the creation of NEPAD and the norms 
and values  it  builds  on have not been affected  to  any greater  extent. NEPAD 
whose peer review mechanism is structured around an independent review process 
of an African country’s adherence to good governance criteria, could be seen as 
another step towards the institutionalization of norms derived from contemporary 
Western  concerns  (Alden  2005:157).  Nevertheless,  China  has  expressed  its 
support of NEPAD, although China repeatedly stresses that it does so through the 
framework of the China- Africa Cooperation Forum.  Thereby China has avoided 
the position of having to support the key structural elements that are ultimately 
necessary for NEPAD’s success (Thompson 2005:2). 
The picture which presents itself so far is a situation where African states 
see themselves as underdeveloped, backwards and in need to be more integrated 
in the global system and on more equal terms. The leaders initiating NEPAD have 
chosen to focus on democracy, good governance and human rights as means to a 
sustainable  development  and  thereby  they  have  attracted  support  from  major 
international  institutions  like the  G8,  EU, UN but  also China has expressed a 
cautionary support.  In addition some broad, general  preferences of the African 
states  as  principals  have been  presented  and the next  chapter  will  look at  the 
implications of these preferences for NEPAD’s design.
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6. NEPAD as a political institution – Making states comply
6.1 NEPAD and APRM - The institutional design 
Some  of  the  features  of  NEPAD’s  institutional  design  have  already  been 
mentioned, i.e. that it recognizes democracy, good governance and human rights 
as important to a sustainable development. These principles have been supported 
by further  undertakings  embodied  in  the  Declaration  on  Democracy,  Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance and compliance with these undertakings is 
to be monitored by the APRM (Maluwa 2006:296). All of this will get some more 
attention in this section since the way NEPAD and the APRM have been design 
have implications on how power can be exercised to reach compliance.
Before  moving  deeper  into  the  concept  of  peer  review  an  important 
difference between peer reviews and judicial proceedings should here be made, 
where the non-binding character of outcomes of peer reviews have the implication 
that no superior body is able to make legal judgments (Pagani 2002:16). States 
that volunteer to join the NEPAD process instead commit themselves to respect 
their obligations, assumed under other relevant regional and international treaties, 
in  the  areas  of  democracy,  good  governance  and  human  rights  (Maluwa 
2006:296). However, not all of these principles, standards, codes, and values are 
necessarily grounded in international treaties or other instruments that the states 
have adopted under the protection of the AU (Maluwa 2006:298). 
It is wise to be clear about the meaning of peer review as a concept, since 
Pagani (2002:15) argues that peer review has not been rigorously defined in the 
past.  In this case, as in the case of international  organizations in general,  peer 
review refers to the systematic assessment of a state by other states, by designated 
institutions  or by a combination  of states and designated  institutions  (UNECA 
2002:7;  Pagani  2002:15).  Peer  review aims to  help reviewed states  adopt  best 
practices, improve its policy making and comply with established standards and 
principles.  But as Pagani states,  peer review relies heavily on the mutual trust 
among involved states and a shared confidence in the process. Nonetheless,  if 
these elements, together with some other elements, are in place peer review tends 
to  create  a  system  of  mutual  accountability  through  its  reciprocal  system  of 
evaluation (Pagani 2002:16). Still, Pagani (2002:16) argue that for peer review to 
be effective it is important to take into account the related concept of influence 
through peer pressure; the persuasion exercised by the peers.
The  effectiveness  of  peer  review  mechanisms  in  general,  or  APRM 
specifically, is not a central concern to this thesis but the concept of peer pressure 
offers some insight in the ability of different actors to exercise power. The peer 
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review process  can give rise  to  peer  pressure through,  for  example:  a  mix  of 
formal  recommendations  and  informal  dialogue  by  the  peer  countries;  public 
scrutiny,  comparisons  and  ranking  among  countries;  and  the  impact  of  the 
foregoing  on  domestic  public  opinion,  policy  makers,  and  other  stakeholders 
(UNECA 2002:8). Lessons from peer reviews done elsewhere suggest that  the 
greatest impact is derived when the outcomes of peer reviews are made available 
to the public. When the media is provided with information on peer reviews, the 
story can then be mass distributed to the public. It is that public scrutiny that is 
most likely to coerce change and corrective actions (UNECA 2002:8). Reputation 
has always been important in politics but with the “paradox of the plenty”, the 
role of credibility increases. The “paradox of the plenty” is what Nye (2004:106) 
calls  the  paradox  when  the  explosion  of  information,  due  to  technological 
advances, leads to a scarcity of attention.  Politics has with the help of technology 
become a competition over credibility where information is used to enhance the 
credibility of one and reduce the credibility of others (Nye 2004:106). To some 
extent  this  could  be  connected  to  the  concept  of  compulsory  power  since  the 
APRM could use other actors such as media and the general public to put pressure 
through ideational resources.
Staying  on the  subject  of  peer  review one can  look more  closely at  the 
APRM at its mandate:
 “The mandate of the African Peer Review Mechanism is to ensure 
that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the  
agreed political,  economic and corporate governance values, codes  
and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political,  
Economic  and  Corporate  Governance.  The  APRM is  the  mutually  
agreed  instrument  for  self-monitoring  by  the  participating  member  
governments.” (NEPAD 2003:p2)
The most interesting feature of its mandate is that it tells us that before signing up 
for review the state in question must agree with the Declaration on Democracy, 
Political,  Economic  and  Corporate  Governance.  One  should  also  note  the 
difference  between  the  initiators  of  NEPAD  and  the  creators  of  the  APRM. 
NEPAD  was  initiated  by  South  Africa,  Senegal,  Nigeria,  Algeria  and  Egypt 
whiles the APRM, although a mechanism for implementation is mentioned in the 
NEPAD document, was decided by the heads of state and government of the AU.
Lacking  coercive  powers,  Kebonang  and  Fombad  (2006:52)  argues  that 
APRM should be seen as “soft law enforcement”. Thus it is even more interesting 
to study how compliance is supposed to be reached. However it should be noted, 
as a formal part of the AU the Constitutive Act also offers possibilities to exercise 
power.  Putting  an  emphasis  on  collective  responsibility  instead  of  national 
sovereignty and non-intervention, the members of AU was under the Constitutive 
Act capable to collectively agree on intervention in the internal affairs of another 
member under particularly grave circumstances (Melber 2006:5).  Explicitly, the 
Constitutive Act codifies the possibility and terms of direct  intervention into a 
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member state as mandated by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) if it finds that 
there are gross violations of human rights, or other humanitarian reasons (Alden 
2005:157).
Those  criticizing  NEPAD  to  be  a  neoliberal  project  building  on  the 
“Washington-Consensus”  argue  that  NEPAD  puts  additional  economic  and 
political conditionality on states already heavily constrained by earlier conditional 
ties from Social Adjustment Programs (SAP), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) and by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), all led by 
the  World  Bank  and  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  (Loxley  2003:124f). 
Loxley (2003:124f) argue that the HIPC program, in fact does to little to help low-
income  countries  and  nothing  to  help  middle-income  countries,  which  leaves 
states wishing for further development aid little choice but to agree with these 
additional conditionalities constituted in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, 
Economic and Corporate Governance.  This may give rise to the possibility for 
development partners to exercise power through NEPAD. 
Theoretically there will be four types of reviews but where the first - the 
base review that is carried out within eighteen months of a country becoming a 
member of the APRM - is the only one carried out at  the time,  and just  in a 
handful  of  the  282 signatory  states  (NEPAD  2003:p14;  NEPAD  2007a).  In 
addition there is the possibility of a periodic review that takes place every two to 
four years, a requested additional review by member states for its own reasons and 
finally, early signs of impending political or economic crisis in a member country 
would also be sufficient cause for instituting a review “in the spirit of helpfulness” 
for the concerned government (NEPAD 2003:p14). What this means in reality is 
unclear since reviews so far is limited to the base review.
The peer review has five stages which are preceded by a preparatory stage 
which basically means that the state sign a memorandum of understanding but 
have  jet  not  started  the  process  (UNECA  2008).  Stage  1 includes  a  self-
assessment of the political,  economic and corporate governance and the overall 
development  environment  by  the  state  itself  with  assistance  from the  APRM 
Secretariat  (NEPAD  2003:p18).  Stage  2 involves  a  review  by  the  appointed 
review team for widespread stakeholder consultation (NEPAD2003:p19). In stage 
3 the  review  is  presented after  the  report  is  measured  against  the  applicable 
political,  economic  and  corporate  governance  commitments  made  and  the 
Program of Action (POA). The concerned government  is  then able to  give its 
reactions to the findings, confirm the information’s accuracy and put forward its 
views on how shortcomings could be addressed (NEPAD 2003:p20-21). Stage 4 
begins when the team’s report is submitted to the participating Heads of State and 
Government  through the  APRM Secretariat.   The  report  is  considered  by  the 
2  Mauretania joined the APRM as the 29th member in January 2008 but was excluded in October 2008 due to a 
coup which also got Mauretania excluded from the AU (BBC 2008). The other 28 signatures include Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya, Cameroon, Gabon and Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Egypt and Benin, Malawi, Lesotho, Tanzania, 
Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia Sao Tome and Principe, Djibouti  and Togo 
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participating  Heads  of  State  and  Government  and  a  final  report  is  adopted 
(NEPAD  2003:p23).  Finally,  stage  5,  implies  that  six  months  after  the 
considerations by participating Heads of State and Government the final report 
shall be publicized and available to regional and sub-regional structures such as 
the Pan- African Parliament,  the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, the envisaged Peace and Security Council and the Economic, Social and 
Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)3 of the African Union (NEPAD 2003:p25). Even 
though the APRM is a voluntary process, Melber (2006:6) argue that it possess a 
high degree of legitimacy for those states prepared to undergo assessment, and 
represents an attractive opportunity to strengthen the international reputation of 
the assessed state.
6.2 NEPAD and APRM – compliance and state resistance 
When analyzing the creation of NEPAD, states’ preferences as principals were 
mentioned,  but  the  P-S-A sees  states  as  agents  as  well.  The  preference  of  a 
rational  state  as  an  agent  in  the  context  of  European  governance  is  to  soften 
adjustment  demands (Tallberg 2003:29).  This section aims to evaluate  African 
states as agents and if similar tendencies can be seen in the context of NEPAD as 
in the EU.  Furthermore, since rational choice institutionalism argues that political 
institutions guide and restrain actors’ behavior through different forms of power 
this section will also include how states try to resist this exercise of power. 
Looking back at the four types of reviews, from a rational choice point of 
view these types of reviews are interesting when states are also seen as agents in 
the P-S-A model. Why states with an incitement to free-ride would sign up for 
voluntary assessments and be up for scrutiny might seem unclear? The fact that 
the  base  review  is  the  only  one  carried  out  jet  could  point  in  this  direction. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that NEPAD have only existed since 
2001, APRM since 2003 and some signatories came as late as 2008 so the time 
span for the panel of eminent persons to carry out reviews have been quite short. 
Then the fact that only six states have jet finalized their final report of the base 
review might be more of an indication of free-riding and, by May 2008, 15 states 
still had not started their self-assessment (UNECA 2008).  One main implication 
of the design of the APRM is that in practice power of decision-making is still 
vested with the states prepared to be reviewed. According to Melber (2006:6) this 
raises the question of the true degree of autonomous and independent reviewing 
when the result of the review will only be accessible with the authorization and 
consent of the reviewed state. The preference of the states as principals to limit the 
enforcement mechanism shines through in this aspect.
One of the few state reviews that have been finalized is the South African 
peer review presented in its final form in 2007.  The report stated i.e. that South 
3 ECOSOCC is a advisory organ of the AU created to involve the civil society in its activities (Fombad 2006:28).
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Africa  had problems  with unemployment  which  affected  the  poverty in  South 
Africa  and  at  the  same  time  criticized  the  government  for  failing,  despite  its 
efforts, to deal with the structural unemployment (NEPAD 2007b:19). The South 
African  response  was  to  highlight  its  legacy from the  apartheid  regime  as  an 
explanation  to  inequalities  and  poverty  and raised  questions  about  the  APRM 
panels methodological choices when South Africa was examined (South Africa 
2007:4ff,  7).  Without  putting  any  emphasis  on  the  validity  of  any  of  these 
critiques it highlights how South Africa is trying to soften the critique by putting 
focus on the APRM instead. South African newspaper The Times (2007) goes as 
far as accusing the South African government for jeopardizing the future of the 
APRM by not acknowledging their recommendations and avoiding fulfillment of 
its  undertakings  under  the  APRM memorandum.  Other  attempts  to  soften  the 
impact and resist the powers of NEPAD and the APRM are visible in other states 
as well.
Wafula  Oguttu,  spokesperson  of  the  oppositional  party  Forum  for 
Democratic Change (FDC) in Uganda, expressed mistrust in NEPAD and APRM 
as  institutions  after  the  release  of  the  Ugandan peer  review.  The once  strong 
leadership of South African leader Thabo Mbeki and Nigerian Olusegun Obasanjo 
gave rise to optimism about NEPAD and APRM, although according to Oguttu, 
these organizations is by now only used as trade unions and clubs for dictators 
trying  to  keep  existing  power  structures  by  secure  the  welfare  of  the  ruling 
political  classes  (Oguttu  2009).  This  might  be  seen  as  attempts  by  Oguttu  to 
advance the position of FDC in Uganda by criticize NEPAD and APRM and point 
to the Ugandan peer review. Whether this is true or not are of lesser interest. More 
interesting is the threat that the criticism can pose to the eventual soft power that 
NEPAD as an organization possess. Soft power is dependent on the reputation of 
the  organization  (Nye  2004:95),  and  for  a  organization  promoting  good 
governance being criticized for being a club for dictators would most certain have 
a negative impact on its soft powers.  
Staying on the subject of soft power and the accusation of NEPAD as a club 
of dictators it is interesting to look back at the structure and design of the APRM. 
Although not initially a part  of the AU, NEPAD is, as mentioned earlier,  now 
considered the development plan to meet the development objectives of the AU. 
Highest political and implementing authority is Heads of State and Government 
Implementation Committee (HSGIC) (Fombad 2006:32). HSGIC is composed of 
the five heads of state from the funding states together with ten other (two from 
each region), and reports  annually to the AU (NEPAD 2001:57). So far, there 
might  not  be  any major  problems  but  if  one  considers  how the  states  in  the 
HSGIC  performs  in  democracy  rankings,  indexes  of  political  rights  and  civil 
liberties  the  question  of  soft  power  once  again  presents  itself  (see  i.e.  World 
Audit). Fombad (2006:35) asks similar questions without mentioning soft power 
when looking at the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU together with 
NEPAD, HSGIC and other organs that will determine if violations of obligations 
exist. Since violations of commitments by states does not rest on its legal merits, 
but  on  instructions  received  from member  states,  peer  solidarity  will  militate 
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against the finding of a violation of an obligation on anything but obvious cases 
(Fombad 2006:35). So, when the members of reviewing organs represents states 
guilty  of  human rights  violations,  bad governance and with severe democratic 
deficits, Fombad (2006:35) is doubtful to which extent these states can condemn 
and support actions against other states undemocratic behavior. 
One of the key development partners of NEPAD is, as mentioned earlier the 
G8  and  Akokpari  (2004:246)  goes  as  far  as  calling  the  partnership  a  “moral 
contract” between the African states and G8. Through “enhanced partnerships”, 
established by the G8, aid is to be given to the African states and is expected to 
transfer  up  to  $64  billion  annually  if  G8  meets  its  obligations  (Akokpari 
2004:246).  This  means  that  the  G8,  even  without  intentions,  could  exercise 
compulsory power since African states in need of aid and investments are likely to 
adopt  practices  which they believe the G8 and its  investors  agree with and in 
theory it must be seen as fully rational for the African states to do so. Even though 
NEPAD  stress  that  it  is  not  looking  for  further  entrenchment  of  dependency 
through  aid,  Loxley  (2003:124)  argue  that,  with  a  initial  level  of  $14  billion 
annually in aid, it is hard to see how this dependency would not increase when aid 
is doubled or even tripled (dependent on how much is financed by the African 
states themselves or through foreign direct investments). 
Looking at the financial situation of NEPAP in relation to the concept of 
compulsory power in a related but slightly different angle, another implication 
than  the issue of  African  independence  comes  to  mind.  The fact  that  G8 and 
outside investors possess the main economic power in relation to NEPAD is most 
interesting when put in comparison with economic power within AU and NEPAD, 
given compulsory power is  a  zero sum game.  The economic power possessed 
outside  Africa  therefore  implicates  that  AU,  and  NEPAD  in  particular,  lack 
economic  power to increase  incitements  for affected  states  to  comply with its 
norms and values. NEPAD itself does not possess any means to financially punish 
states with faulty results on their review. Instead it is states or companies that 
possess  economic  means  and  thereby  means  to  put  pressure.  Empirical 
experiences show, within the three first years not one company invested in the 20 
high  profile  areas  in  the  framework  and  within  the  NEPAD  staff  there  is 
recognition  that  companies  have not  played a  role as large as expected (Bond 
2004:611). Keeping that in mind, the voluntary review seems like an irrational 
choice  when  states  with  good  reviews  do  not  get  rewarded  with  increased 
investments.  
If NEPAD’s ability to make states comply through compulsory power rests 
on individual states will to voluntarily put themselves up for review and the will 
of individual states to put themselves up for review rests on the possibility to get 
rewarded,  NEPAD’s  power  rests  on  its  ability  attract  aid  and  investments. 
Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes the calculus approach to behavior and 
this  behavior  rests  on  how  others  are  likely  to  behave.  In  comparison  with 
compulsory  power,  the  institutional  power  that  NEPAD  exercise  by  putting 
democracy very firmly on the agenda force states to strive for a more democratic 
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society. Otherwise they may risk being excluded from both NEPAD and the AU, 
or  at  least  in  theory  they  do.  The  AU  failed  to  take  measurements  against 
Zimbabwe after the 2004 election which showed some weakness in the document 
(Luiz  2006:227).  According  to  Luiz  (2006:227),  the  next  necessary  step  is 
therefore to marginalize non-compliers within NEPAD and the AU and to deny 
them access in terms of membership and benefits. This will demonstrate Africa’s 
commitment to democracy and strengthen the power of NEPAD (Luiz 2006:227). 
A step in this direction is the suspension of Mauretania from both the AU and 
NEPAD (or the APRM to be more precise) in 2008 due to a military coup where 
the democratically elected government was overthrown (BBC 2008). 
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7. Conclusions
This  thesis  could be  seen as  an attempt  to  provide  an explanation  to  a  partly 
complex  relationship  between  a  political  institutions  origin,  its  design  and  its 
ability to fulfill its function. The purpose of the thesis  is dual and concentrated 
around two operational questions.
First  the  thesis  aimed  to  answer  how power  relations  could  explain  the 
creation of NEPAD and its design. The rational choice institutionalism and the P-
S-A model  which  were  used  to  answer  this  question  provided  some  possible 
explanations. First, NEPAD can be seen as a rational response to the failure to 
integrate in the global economy where African states have constituted themselves 
as underdeveloped and backwards. This show some fragments of the structural 
power where the African states structural position was constituted in relation to 
the  structural  position  of  the  developed  world  which  is  seen  as  the  desirable 
position.  Second,  the  choice  to  emphasize  good  governance,  democracy  and 
human rights might not just be noble but also fully rational since there have been 
correlations between these norms and economic development. The choice to build 
on “western norms” can also be seen as rational and NEPAD have undoubtedly 
received the support it strived for, although not financially. The balance of power 
between the “Washington Consensus” and the “Beijing Consensus” has not posed 
as a problem to the creation of NEPAD since China also expressed its support. 
The initiating states with South Africa in the forefront exercised intuitional 
power when NEPAD was created and could form the norms and values which the 
political institution should build on. Institutional power was also exercised when 
NEPAD was adopted as an integrated part of the AU which meant that democracy 
and  good  governance  became  norms  and  values  for  the  whole  union  and 
effectively  ruled  out  any  other  possible  political  system  as  legitimate.  The 
preferences as principals also created the APRM on the on hand, but restricted its 
enforcement powers by making it voluntary. 
The  second  operational  question gave  an  overview  on  the  implications 
NEPAD’s  design  had  to  its  ability  to  exercise  different  forms  of  power  for 
enforcement.
 In theory the compulsory power in relation to the APRM rests on the ability 
to  use mainly ideational  resources through peer  pressure.  The effectiveness  of 
peer pressure to some extent depends on how the review is attracting attention. 
The problem which have been highlighted  is  that  states,  even those that  have 
volunteered to the APRM, are able to avoid a lot  of attention since the states 
always have the right to give their opinion before publications and that the APRM 
forum need  the  consent  of  states  to  publish.  The  “soft  law”  approach  makes 
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almost all other forms of compulsory power impossible to carry out. There are no 
economic means available since the major funding of development has to come 
from outside the region. The question is if it is even possible to talk about any 
compulsory power available for the APRM bodies to carry out since there has to 
be a conflict in desires between the APRM and the states (seen as agents). Could 
one talk about a conflict  of desires when the only way is to get the agents to 
volunteer to be reviewed? If NEPAD in addition to this fails allocate financial 
support  from  its  development  partners  it  could  possibly  make  it  harder  for 
NEPAD to  attract  more  states  to  the  APRM.  Leaders  of  neo-patrimonial  and 
failed states have the option to turn to China as development partner instead as 
long as China keeps its “Beijing Consensus” approach.
More interesting is the institutional power where NEPAD and the APRM 
can put values and norms central to them on the agenda within the A with the aim 
to get the AU to take measurements through compulsory power, even though the 
empirical  evidence  show  inconsistencies  in  its  measurements  towards  states 
failing to strive for democracy and human rights. In reality the institutional power 
of the APRM bodies could be questioned. Partly because it has been questioned 
how the HSGIC is supposed to be counted on to deal with these norms when 
themselves have questionable track-records in the same areas. 
The theoretical approach which the rational choice institutionalism provides 
has the implication that some of the concepts of power are more visual in the 
analysis of NEPAD than others. This is not a surprising discovery since rational 
choice institutionalism emphasizes the role of agency prior to the role of structure, 
even though structure matters. Structural power is therefore the least visual of the 
three which have been discussed in this thesis. Thus, it would be interesting in 
future studies to apply other theoretical approaches or use other methodologies to 
study concepts of power, since the theoretical and methodological choices made 
here  makes  the  concept  of  productive  power  nonexistent  in  the  analysis. The 
shortcomings of the rational choice institutionalism do not necessarily mean that 
the picture painted in this thesis is wrong, but it might not show the whole picture. 
All the conclusions in this thesis should be read with some caution because of the 
short time-span of the framework, the limited numbers of reviews and nonexistent 
follow-ups on how reviewed states have handled the recommendations  APRM 
makes.
A somewhat negative picture has been presented above, which partly is due 
to the theoretical approach of the thesis. NEPAD and the APRM could hopefully 
constitute a new view on democracy, good governance and human rights  in the 
world’s poorest continent. Even though NEPAD has been criticized for building 
on neo-liberal ideas connected to the “Washington Consensus”, NEPAD is still an 
initiative from the African leaders themselves which with any luck is a right step 
towards an African development, and with the short time NEPAD have existed in 
mind it is too soon to rule it out. 
30
STVM01
References
Akokpari,  John  K.  2004.  ‘The  AU,  NEPAD  and  the  Promotion  of  Good 
Governance in Africa’. Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(3): 243–263.
Barnett,  Michael & Raymond Duvall.  2005. ’Power in Global Governance’.  In 
Power  in  Global  Governance  eds.  Michael  Barnett  & Raymond  Duvall. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Barnett, Michael & Martha Finnemore. 2005. ‘The Power of Liberal International 
Organizations’.  In  Power in  Global  Governance  eds.  Michael  Barnett  & 
Raymond Duvall. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
BBC. 2008. AU to drop Mauritania after coup. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7551531.stm visited 2009-05-21.
Bond, Patrick. 2004.  'The ANC's 'Left Turn' & South African sub-imperialism'. 
Review of African Political Economy 31(102): 599-616.
Devine, Fiona. 2002. ‘Qualitative Methods’. In Theory and Methods in Political  
Science.  2:a uppl. Eds. David Marsh & Gary Stoker. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Basingstoke.
Edozie, R. Kiki. 2004. ‘Promoting African ‘Owned and Operated’ Development: 
A Reflection on The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)’. 
African and Asian Studies 3(2): 145-173.
Esaiasson, Peter, Mikael Gilljam, Henrik Oscarsson & Lena Wängnerud.  2002. 
Metodpraktikan:  konsten  att  studera  samhälle,  individ  och  marknad.  1:a 
uppl. Norstedts juridik. Stockholm.
Fombad,  Charles  Manga.  2006.  ‘The  African  Union,  Democracy  and  Good 
Governance’.  In  AU,  NEPAD  and  the  APRM:  Democratisation  Efforts  
Explored. Ed. Henning Melber. Uppsala. Nordic African Institute (Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet).
Hall,  Peter A. & Rosmary C.R. Taylor.  1996.  ‘Political  Science and the Three 
New Institutionalisms’. Political Studies 44(5): 936-957.
Hay,  Colin.  2002.  Political  Analysis:  A  Critical  Introduction.  Basingstoke. 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Holme,  Idar  Magne  & Bernt  Krohn Solvang.  1997.  Forskningsmetodik:  om 
kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder. 2:a uppl. Studentlitteratur. Lund.
Hope,  Kempe  Ronald  Sr.  2005.  ‘Towards  Good  Governance  and  Sustainable 
Development:  The  African  Peer  Review  Mechanism’.  Governance:  An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 18(2): 283-
311. 
31
STVM01
Hurrell, Andrew. 2005. ‘Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality’. In 
Power  in  Global  Governance  eds.  Michael  Barnett  & Raymond  Duvall. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Kebonang,  Zein  & Charles  Manga Fombad.  2006.  ‘The  African  Peer  Review 
Mechanism:  Challenges  and Prospects’.  In  AU, NEPAD and the APRM:  
Democratisation  Efforts  Explored.  Ed.  Henning Melber.  Uppsala.  Nordic 
African Institute (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet).
Kanbur, Ravi. 2004 ‘The African peer review mechanism (APRM): an assessment 
of concept and design’. Politikon 31(2):157-166.
Lake, David A. 2007.’Delegating Devisable Sovereignty: Sweeping a Conceptual 
Minefield’. The Review of International Organizations 2(3): 219-237.
Lowndes, Vivien. 2002. ‘Institutionalism’.  In  Theory and Methods in Political  
Science  2nd ed.  David  Marsh  &  Gary  Stoker.  Basingstoke.  Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Loxley,  John. 2003. ’Imperialism & Economic Reform in Africa:  What’s  New 
About the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)?’ Review 
of African Political Economy 95: 119-128.
Luiz,  John.  2006.  ’The  New Partnership  for  African  Development:  Questions 
Regarding  Africa’s  Response  to  its  Underdevelopment’.  Journal  of  
International Development 18: 223–236.
Lundquist, Lennart. 1993.  Det vetenskapliga studiet av politik. Studentlitteratur. 
Lund.
Maluwa,  Tiyanjana.  2006.  ‘The  Move  from  Institutions?  Examine  The 
Phenomenon  in  Africa’.  Proceedings  of  the  American  Society  of  
International Law 294-298.
Mathews,  Sally.  2004.  ‘Investigating  NEPAD’s  Development  Assumptions. 
Review of African Political Economy 101: 497-511.
Melber,  Henning.  2006. ‘AU, NEPAD and the APRM – Towards Democratic 
Change?’ In  AU,  NEPAD  and  the  APRM:  Democratisation  Efforts  
Explored. Ed. Henning Melber. Uppsala. Nordic African Institute (Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet).
NEPAD. 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Midrand. South 
Africa: NEPAD Secretariat.
NEPAD. 2003. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Midrand. South 
Africa: NEPAD Secretariat.
32
STVM01
NEPAD. 2007a. Review Exercises. NEPAD Press Release 2007-05-10.  Available 
at  http://www.nepad.org/2005/news/wmview.php?ArtID=69. Visited 2009-
05-12.
NEPAD.  2007b.  South  African  APR Report.  Midrand.  South  Africa:  NEPAD 
Secretariat.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2004.  Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
New York. PublicAffairs.
Oguttu,  Wafula  &  Ofwono  Opondo.  2009.  Uganda:  African  Peer  Review 
Mechanism  Report  -is  the  Assessment  of  Uganda  True? Avalable  at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200903301446.html. Visited 2009-04-27
Pagani, Fabricio. 2002. Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change: An 
analysis of an OECD working method. African Security Review 11(4): 15-
24.
Peters,  B.  Guy  &  Jon  Pierre.  1998.  ‘Institutions  and  Time:  Problems  of 
Conceptualization and Explanation’.  Journal  of  Public Administration Research  
and Theory 8(4): 565-583.
Ramo,  Joshua  Cooper.  2004.  The Beijing  Consensus.  London:  Foreign  Policy 
Centre
Rittberger,  Volker,  Bernhard  Zangl  &  Matthias  Staisch.  2006.  International  
organization: polity, politics and policies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
South  Africa.  2007.  APRM:  Comments  from the  Government  of  South Africa. 
Available  at  http://www.thetimes.co.za/TheVault/Documents/APRM.pdf 
Visited 2009-05-19. 
Tallberg,  Jonas.  2003.  European  Governance  and  Supranational  Institutions:  
Making States Comply. London. Routledge.
The Times. 2007. Act now, or history will say SA ruined peer review. Published 
2007-05-27. Available at  http://www.thetimes.co.za/TheVault/Article.aspx?
id=474717 Visited 2009-05-19.
Thompson, D. 2005. ‘China’s soft power in Africa: from the ‘‘Beijing Consensus 
’’ to health diplomacy’. China Brief 5(21): 1–4
UNECA. 2002. ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism: Process and Procedures’. 
African Security Review 11(4): 7-13.
UNECA.  2008.  APRM:  Status  of  Countries.  Available  at 
http://www.uneca.org/aprm/CountriesStatus.asp. Visited 2009-05-13.
World  Audit.  2008.  Democracy  Table  October  2008.  Available  at 
http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm Visited 2009-04-02.
33
STVM01
34
